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morally superior. This argument loses its force when one looks at the facts: inequality 
exists in all existing socialist countries; inequality seems to be linked more with the stage of 
a country's development than it does with its political-economic system. It is perfectly 
acceptable to dream about how things might be in one's conception of an ideal world. One 
must be careful, however, not to mix this dream with reality. The socialist utopia does not 
exist, has never' existed, and, if Berger is correct, will never exist. If we reject capitalism on 
the grounds that it is unjust, we must propose a morally superior alternative that is also 
feasible. 
This emphasis on "the facts" is surely the principal strength of this book. While the 
break with positivism-and its overemphasis of objectivity in science-is to be welcomed, 
there is a tendency to use this break to justify ideologically-based assertions that cannot 
stand up to even a casual confrontation with the empirical record. Christians appear 
particularly prone to this tendency. We evaluate systems normatively (as we should) but 
cannot seem to separate the possible from the impossible, the realistic from the unrealistic. 
We are too easily taken in by moral sounding rhetoric which amounts to nothing more 
than wishful thinking. 
Take, for example, the case for "democratic socialism," a system which has broad 
appeal in Christian circles. Most Western socialists today will tell you that what passes for 
socialism in the Soviet Union and its satellites is not socialism at all. True socialism is 
democratic socialism; indeed some would argue that socialism means democracy in all 
spheres of life, from the family, to the work place, to the government. Yet Berger searches 
in vain for even one example-past or present-of democratic socialism. The lack of even 
a single example suggests that there is more at work here than historical accident. Indeed, 
Berger argues persuasively that the centralized power required to maintain a socialist 
economy is incompatible with democratic government. 
My enthusiastic endorsement of this book carries only one qualification: even a sym-
pathetic reader will note the uneven quality of the propositions as judged from the per-
spective of the evidence presented and with regard to their potential falsifiability. Some, as 
written, are virtually unfalsifiable. Take this one, for example: "If capitalist development is 
successful in reaching economic growth from which a sizable proportion of the population 
benefits, pressures toward democracy are likely to appear." What is a "sizable propor-
tion"? How "likely to appear"? Failure to be more precise insulates the proposition from 
potentially falsifying evidence. 
Berger would, I suspect, welcome (though not necessarily agree with) such criticism. 
For it is this sort of scholarly exchange which sharpens our understanding and promotes 
the advancement of our knowledge. He may have overstated the extent to which we can 
come to know through employing a falsifica tionist methodology. But he is surely correct in 
reminding us of how easily we can be led astray by a methodology which ignores the 
empirical record. 
David Basinger and Randall Basinger, Philosophy and Miracle: The Contemporary 
Debate, Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986, 124 pp., $39.95, ISBN 
0-88706-709-3. 
Reviewed by Gary R. Habermas, Liberty University 
With their case clearly presented in five chapters, David and Randall Basinger's argu-
ment may be briefly summarized in five corresponding propositions. (1) The Basingers 
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define a miracle as "a permanently inexplicable event directly caused by God" (p. 23). (2) 
The historian may not reject miracle-claims on a priori grounds so as to disallow reports of 
such events before they can be investigated "on a case by case basis" (p. 51). (3) Yet, 
miracles still can never be justifiably identified as permanently inexplicable events (p. 71). 
(4) With regard to the issue of divine action in an occurrence, one can only be personal/v 
convinced that God has performed an event. But epistemic certainty in any objective sens~ 
is unjustified (p. 100). (5) Additionally, to argue for God's action is essentially to argue for 
a certain world view, an argument in which all relevant data need to be considered (pp. 9, 
116-117). 
The Basingers' argument is helpful at several junctures. For instance, the first chapter, 
concerning a definition of miracle, involves a worthwhile discussion favoring the claim 
that such a definition ought not include the normal requirement that a miracle must break 
the laws of nature (pp. 12-15). Although many scholars disagree, the position argued here 
certainly warrants consideration. The treatment of the relationship between history and 
miracle is fair to the critical position against miracles, concluding not only that miracles 
cannot be rejected in an a priori manner (as is still quite common) but that counterins-
tances which are not repeatable do not destroy the laws of nature (Chapter II). 
My friendship with the authors notwithstanding, I think that there are also major 
weaknesses in this volume. For instance, I think that the words "permanently inexplica-
ble," as utilized in (1), and the proposition that an event can never be justifiably identified 
as a miracle as in (3)-(4), are both based on mistaken assumptions. 
Initially, the process of apologetic reasoning for a miracle is virtually always inductive 
in nature, meaning that it is open to future research. So with regard to permanent inex-
plicability, to investigate historical issues requires us (whether we like it or not) to come to 
results which are presently verifiable, with no future guarantees. Also, even those (few?) 
apologists who hold that miracles can be established as permanently inexplicable, would 
in most cases still be interested in studying and answering any flltllre claims that such 
events were not acts of God. This translates, at least in practical terms, into present 
inexplicability. 
Additionally, several philosophers have argued that certain rare miracle-claims are 
not only presently inexplicable, but it appears that applicable laws will have no explanato-
ry power in the future, either. For instance, cancer is the sort of thing for which one would 
expect to discover a future cure, whereas the resurrection of Jesus (in a glorified body) 
would presumably be much more troublesome for the naturalist, in that not only is it 
presently inexplicable, but there are no hints how it could ever be explained. So while 
Richard Swinburne, for example, holds that laws and conclusions concerning miracles are 
always corrigible, he can still hold that some events, if they occurred, are physically 
impossible. 
Lastly, to hold that one must have permanent inexplicability and then to add that 
miracles can never be objectively recognized because such knowledge is unobtainable, is 
to refuse ever to reach a conclusion on a crucial issue. Almost any scientific (or other 
factual) conclusion could be treated similarly: maybe we should just wait and see if the 
prevailing view will change in the future. In sum, to include the concept of permanent 
inexplicability is undesirable because it entails unnecessary propositions such as (3). 
This reviewer also objects to the contention, in propositions (3) and (4), that miracles 
can never be objectively identified. The Basingers' thesis depends both on the validity of 
the concept of permanent inexplicability and on their assumption that the differences 
between the various religious "holy writings" make such recognition very difficult, if not 
impossible (p. 96). What prevents us from utilizing appropriate criteria in checking claims 
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concerning these competing scriptures? In fact, some recent efforts in comparative studies 
appear to indicate that there are ripe opportunities to compare these texts. 
Additionally, there are good grounds for claiming at least theoretical possibility for the 
recognition of provisional cases of convergence, where the verification of the factual side 
of a relevant miracle-claim was accompanied by the plainly religious message of a major 
religious personage. Could such cases not provide some compelling reasons at least to 
seriously consider the claims of God's action in the event(s) in question? Christian theism 
appears to have just such historical corroboration for its chief miracle-claim, the resurrec_ 
tion of Jesus, especially when considered in conjunction with his Person and teachings. In 
fact, atheist Antony Flew (who dominates much of the critical perspective in the Basingers' 
work) recently admitted that the last point is a valid one: if Jesus' resurrection was demon_ 
strated, then even the naturalist would have to be open both to Jesus' claims to be God and 
to his world view, even if it meant changing one's naturalistic perspective. 
The Basingers' proposition (5) should be briefly mentioned, namely, that the subject 
of miracles also involves the issue of world views. Here again the discussion reaches an 
impasse regarding the knowledge of God's action on anything but a level of personal 
conviction. 
While one's world view is undeniably crucial in one's outlook on a miracle-claim, 
world views also ought not to be held against substantial relevant evidence to the contrary; 
they ought to be based at least partially upon the facts. The resurrection of Jesus has some 
strong implications for a world view largely because it does not stand alone as a brute fact 
of history, but must be interpreted within the context of Jesus' claims and teachings. 
The Basingers also claim that if we allow a miracle to stand as evidence in favor of a 
world view we should likewise entertain the evidence against theism derived from the 
problem of pain and evil. I thought this discussion in the last chapter was not as well 
reasoned as the rest of the volume. Why should the theist feel the threat of the Basingers' 
false dilemma of choosing between God's goodness and His omnipotence, especially 
when there are many other options for the theist which are never addressed? I think that 
explaining the resurrection, Jesus' claims, and the entire case for Christian theism along 
with evil, constitutes a much stronger position than explaining the same data from a 
naturalistic perspective. 
In current discussions of religiOUS epistemology, positions which arrive at various 
levels of uncertainty (such as one's having personal assurance only) are popular. The 
Basingers' presentation in this volume is an example of this trend. While it is a good 
representation of the contemporary stance of some scholars, I believe that it seriously 
underestimates the strength of the evidence for miracles and its overall relevance to the 
Christian theistic world view. 
